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One of the main challenges that investors in the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) project face is the management of the volatility of the price of Certified Emission 
Reduction (CERs).  Large scale CDM projects require a long-term investment with 
significant amount of costs, and this type of investment is often irreversible.  Project 
investors should quantitatively assess the CER trigger price that justifies the initiation of a 
CDM investment.  The traditional discounted cash flow valuation is unable to capture the 
option value associated with uncertain investment, and thus it tends to underestimate the 
trigger price which initiates the investment. 
Real options theory explicitly considers the option value of delayed investment and 
can provide a better measurement of the trigger price.  This paper presents a theoretical 
model of the CDM investment project and derives the CER trigger prices that guide 
investment decisions by using historical market data.  It develops a stochastic dynamic 
programming model for both the geometric Brownian motion process and the mean-reverting 
process.  An analytical solution for the trigger price is derived for the former process, and the 
trigger price is numerically estimated for the latter.  By considering various parameter values, 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Outline 
  Over the past decade, emissions trading of greenhouse gases has moved from 
academia to the frontline of business.  Market mechanisms are believed to be a better way of 
achieving an abatement target than governmental regulations because of cost efficiency.  
Two principal market mechanisms, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Emission 
Trading, were adopted by the Kyoto Protocol, which was ratified by most industrialized 
states. 
The CDM allows governments or private firms to accumulate Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) from project activities in developing countries.  The Emissions Trading, 
most notably the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), allows trade of surplus 
emission allocations among the participants.   
This radically new carbon market has brought business opportunities – and 
managerial judgments at the same time – to a wide range of firms that are now under the 
regulations of the Kyoto Protocol.  Such a firm needs to either invest in a CDM project and 
obtain CERs or purchase CERs from a carbon market.  
The purpose of this thesis is to study the valuation of CDM projects with the 
underlying price of CERs traded on the EU ETS.  While much work has been done on policy                         
analysis and instrumental comparison with regards to the CDM scheme,  less work has been 
done on empirical evaluation of the outcomes of the market mechanism.  With real options 
theory, this research quantitatively examines the implications of the CDM scheme on 
investors’ decision process.   
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This thesis evaluates CER trigger prices for an ongoing CDM projects that justifies 
the investment, using the historical market history of the European Climate Exchange.  It 
examines numerical results and performs sensitivity analysis with various parameter values. 
Understanding this type of valuation is of particular importance for both policy makers and 
corporate managerial decision-makers who need to make challenging investment decisions in 
the era of global warming. 
1.2 Motivation of Research   
During the past few decades, the issues of greenhouse gases and global warming have 
attracted lots of attention and several alternative approaches have been proposed to reduce 
the emission of greenhouse gases. Market-based mechanisms such as tradable permits are 
considered an efficient way to achieve the abatement targets. The Kyoto Protocol proposed 
three such flexible mechanisms: emissions trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).  
The cap-and-trade programs, or emission trading, have become one of the main 
policy instruments among the ratified countries.  JI is a project-based market mechanism that 
allows two ratified countries to obtain credits from a joint emissions abatement project.  
Likewise, CDM is also a project-based market mechanism that transfers emission credits 
from a project in a non ratified country to a ratified country. 
Under the CDM, firms can accumulate emission credits, namely Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs), from their abatement projects in developing countries, and firms can 
achieve the same amount of emission reductions with a lower cost. Thus, firms are faced 
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with the decision of whether to invest CDM projects in developing countries or instead to 
purchase CERs in permit markets. 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the firm’s decision making process in the 
context of the CDM projects. With uncertain evolution of the price of CERs, firms compare 
the profit under the CDM projects with the profit from the direct purchase of emission 
permits. Historical trend on the European Climate Exchange shows that CER prices 
fluctuated substantially from 9 euros to 30 euros over the past few years. Based on the 
various parameters from empirical data, this thesis derives the trigger price that induces firms 
to invest in the CDM projects. This type of study will be important for both firms which have 
to make informed investment decisions under volatile price changes and policymakers who 
have to make accurate valuations of CDM projects to achieve the emission target efficiently. 
1.3 Outline of the Paper 
Chapter 2 introduces the tradable permits in the context of environmental economics. 
It is followed by the institutional aspects of market mechanisms, such as the EU ETS and the 
CDM, which are institutionalized under the Kyoto Protocol  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on emission trading and real options approach.  A 
particular focus is on real options applications in environmental economics. 
Chapter 4 constructs two dynamic programming models - geometric Brownian 
motion process and mean-reverting process.  Mathematical expressions for the trigger price 
in both models are derived. 
Chapter 5 investigates the trigger prices for a plausible CDM project by using CER 
historical prices.  I will further perform a sensitivity analysis on models parameters. 
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Chapter 6 summarizes the numerical results as well as possible future improvements. 






Chapter 2. Institutional Aspects of Emission Permits 
Pollution is a typical example of market failures in which the private cost of pollution 
abatement is different from the social cost, and it is often recommended that government 
intervention is necessary. Several policy instruments are proposed to regulate pollution, 
including traditional command-and-control regulations, industry voluntary agreements, 
market-based instruments, and informational devices (Sarkis and Tamarkin, 2005).  
Command-and-control requires the government to set a cap on each firm and to penalize the 
firms that exceed its cap.  An industry voluntary agreement is achieved by imposing and 
complying with a voluntary target set by the industry.  An example of informational devices 
is a public campaign for hybrid cars.  
The most discussed market-based instrument is the cap-and-trade program, which is 
the basis for both the U.S. sulfur trading program and the Kyoto Protocol.  There have been 
debates over the past few decades that whether market-based mechanism is superior to 
command-and-control approach in reducing pollutions, and the consensus is shifted toward 
the market-based mechanism (Schmalensee et al., 1998).  Among the various types of 
market-based instruments, this thesis focuses on the tradable permits, in which the 
government allocates an initial quota of pollution permit to polluters and allows them to trade 
surplus permits among polluters. By reducing pollution by various abatement efforts, 
polluters with surplus permits can increase the revenue through the trade of extra allowances.  
The U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program proved that the tradable permit approach is 
superior to command-and-control regulation. The advantage of the tradable permits approach 
is the economic efficiency; it achieves a target level at the lowest level by allowing firms the 
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flexibility of minimizing the abatement costs (Joskow et al., 1998). Several conditions are 
required to ensure a successful tradable permits program.  
First, the pollution source must be non-isolated with global effects.  Otherwise, the 
pollution permits will not be tradable across regions. Second, there should be a large number 
of participants in order to ensure a price discovery function which matches the seller and the 
buyer in a market.  An emission market with too few participants may lack the liquidity of 
permits and limit its functionality. Third, the tradable scheme rests on accurate emissions 
monitoring and strict enforcement of the property rights of permits. Finally, an initial 
allocation of quota should be fairly implemented.  
2.1 U.S. Sulfur dioxide trading program 
The sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade program implemented under the 1990 U.S. Clean 
Air Act is the first large-scale, long-term tradable permits scheme to cut sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen dioxide. This program aimed to cut sulfur dioxide emission from power plants to 
half of their 1980 level by 2005. 
The commitment period was divided into two phases: Phase I was from 1995 through 
1999 and Phase II from 2000 through 2005.  In Phase I, annual emissions from the 263 most 
polluting coal-fired power plants must go below a cap.  During Phase II, almost all existing 
fossil-fired power units were capped under the annual emission limits. 
Under this cap-and-trade program, the government issues a total amout of tradable 
permits, or allowances, which give firms the right to emit pollution up to permitted 
allowances of SO2 in a given year. If a firm wants to go beyond its allowance, it has to 
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purchase additional allowances from other sources in the permit market.  On the other hand, 
firms with extra allowances can sell them or carry over for future use.  
In both phases, newly established power units must buy allowances from existing 
plants.  The initial allowance quotas are determined by historic emissions and are freely 
traded anywhere in the United States. 
Since the government issues fewer amount of allowances than needed, allowances are 
valuable and traded with a positive price. Thus, polluting firms are faced with two choices; 
either they purchase extra amount of permits from the market or they invest in abatement 
technologies to reduce the emission. If the investment in abatement technologies is cheaper 
than purchasing allowances, firms have an incentive to reduce their emission through 
investment. 
Many firms aggressively switched to low-sulfur coal and installed scrubbers, and as a 
result the aggregate amount of sulfur dioxide emission dropped to a 33% below the target 
level in 1996 (Schmalensee et al., 1998). According to the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), SO2 emissions went down from an annualized amount of 9.7 million tons in 
1980 to 4.7 million tons in 1998 (US EPA 1999). The average cost of emission reduction was 
$187/ton, which is at the low end of the estimated range, and the typical allowance price was 
between $100/ton - $150/ton during 1995 to1996.  The relatively low allowance prices were 
due to the large initial investments in scrubbers. A large volume of allowance transactions 
ensured the allowance market work properly.  The program helped reduce the pollution target 
level at a much lower cost than projected, and several studies show successful achievements 
of the program (Schmalensee et al., 1998). 
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During Phase II, total affected sulfur dioxide emissions dropped to 11.2 million tons 
in 2000: almost 40% below 1980 levels.  In 2003, total emissions fluctuated up to 10.6 
million tons due to low utilization of nuclear plants and high natural gas prices.  Overall, 
during Phase II, annual emissions exceeded the caps by 1 to 1.5 million tons every year 
(Burtraw et al., 2005).  However, these excesses were met by banked allowances during 
Phase I. 
2.2 The Kyoto Protocol 
With the success of the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program, the tradable permits 
scheme has been adopted to deal with the global greenhouse gas problems.  The Kyoto 




The protocol requires the ratified parties to reduce green house gases by an individual quota 
during its first commitment period from 2008 to 2012, using the 1990 base level.  In order to 
prompt abatement efforts, the protocol has adopted three market mechanisms: Emission 
Trading, Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation.  
The first mechanism, emissions trading, according to Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
allows countries which would not otherwise meet their targets to purchase credits from other 
nations.  It includes:  Certified emission reductions from projects under the Clean 
Development Mechanism, Emission reduction units from projects under Joint 
Implementation.  The largest implementation of emissions trading to date is the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (Hepburn 2007).  
                                                     
1
 It has been ratified by most major developed countries except the United States.  
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The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), allocates carbon dioxide caps to 
major energy-intensive industries in the EU region and allows the trade of surplus emission 
allocations among the participants.  This radically new carbon market has brought cost-
saving opportunities to a wide range of firms that have advanced low-carbon technology. 
The Joint Implementation (JI) is a market-based instrument that enables a state with 
binding targets to obtain credit from projects undertaken in another ratified country.  Projects 
under the JI yield Emission reduction units (ERUs), which is equivalent of one ton carbon 
dioxide emission.  Produced ERUs must be approved by relevant parties.  Major JI host 
countries include Russia and Eastern European states because they experienced an economic 
downturn after 1990, and they enjoyed more relaxed targets compared to the other 
participating nations.  With regards to major obstacles of implementing JI, Rose et al. (1999) 
argue that extraction-biased technological change and cumulative abatement effects increase 
future abatement costs of hosting countries. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows the government or private firms 
in a ratified state to accumulate Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from project activities 
in developing countries so as to meet its commitment.  Firms can invest in a CDM project in 
a developing country and gain CERs, resulting in a lower cost than investments in abatement 
at home or purchasing CERs from other parties. 
2.3 The European Emission Trading Schemes (EU ETS) 
The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was launched by 25 EU countries on 
January 2005, to achieve the target of an 8% reduction under the Kyoto Protocol. The initial 
phase of the EU ETS which ends on December 2007 was designed to familiarize EU firms 
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with carbon trading. The second phase which runs through January 2008 to December 2012 
exactly coincides with the commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.  This scheme is 
considered the largest tradable carbon dioxide permits scheme to date Ellerman et al. (2007). 
The scheme is targeted on over 11,000 emissions sites, including power plants, oil 
refineries, coke ovens, steel plants, cement factories.  They are collectively responsible for 
some 45% of carbon dioxide emissions.  EU firms now are governed by carbon constrains in 
form of legally emission targets.  Each installation is allocated with free carbon permits, EU 
Allowances (EUAs), for free based on the past emissions.  Alternatively, member states can 
auction up to 10% of their EUAs.  The scheme covers almost half of the total EU carbon 
dioxide emissions (Convery and Redmond, 2007).  
EUAs are actively and freely traded on the European Climate Exchange (ECX).  
Firms are to purchase EUAs to cover excessive emissions.  More importantly, the EU ETS is 
driving much of the activity in the CDM.  The EU ETS has become the hub of the global 
carbon trading due to the implementation of the Linking Directive on November 2004. 
 EUA was listed on the ECX on April 2005, and the EUA price had been fluctuating 
between 15 and 30 euro.  But, it has been in a downward shift, within a range of 10 to 15 
euro, since 2008 summer primary because of the world financial crisis. 
2.4 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows the 
government or private firms of a ratified state to accumulate Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) from project activities in a non ratified country. CERs are created if all parties give 
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their voluntary approval and if the emissions reductions are real, measurable, and additional.  
The process of investing a project under the CDM requires the project investor to satisfy a 
number of procedural stages. 
Projects are first proposed in a formal Project Design Document, which contains 
detailed information.  It includes a study of what would have been without the project, the 
baseline, and the monitoring and verification plan to determine the quantity of emissions 
abatement that is indeed additional to the status quo.  It also presents an estimate of expected 
emissions reduced. Projects are assessed by the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) against 
approved methodologies for determining monitoring process and the baseline (Hepburn, 
2007). 
The Project Design Document has to be validated by a Designated Operational Entity 
which evaluates whether the project meets the relevant criteria, most crucially the 
additionality criteria that show project outputs are indeed additional emission reductions.  
After the validation process, the CDM project is registered by the CDM EB and becomes a 
formal project.  Thereafter, the project’s monitored emissions reduced are periodically 
verified and certified by a Designated Operational Entity.  Based on a certification report, the 
CDM EB issues CERs and forwards them into the registry accounts of project participants 
(Hepburn, 2007). 
Typical CDM projects to date have included renewable energy projects (wind, 
smaller-scale hydro, renewable biomass) and the capture of damaging greenhouse gases such 
as methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons. 
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 CERs yielded from a CDM project can be traded over-the-counter or on a market, 
most notably the EU ETS.  CER was listed on the EU ETS on March 2008.  The CER price 
had initially been volatile between 15 and 25 euro.  However, likewise the EUA price, it has 
seen a downward trend since 2008 summer. 
2.4.1 Relation between CDM and EU ETS 
The Linking Directive is an implementation of the EU ETS which  allows the use of 
CERs credits from CDM projects as the EUAs in the EU ETS, and they are commonly 
counted by one carbon dioxide equivalent ton.  Therefore, EUAs and CERs have been inter-
exchangeable in the form of swaps.  Trading through the major subsidiary scheme of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), has large transactions.  Carbon 
trading on the EU ETS in 2006 comprised 67% of the global carbon markets by volume, and 
81% by value (Hepburn, 2007). 
 In the following models, I assume that CDM projects can be evaluated by using the 
price of CERs traded on the ECX.  The basic assumption is that carbon markets are efficient 
in that all participants are equally informed and there is no insider dealing. The monetary 
value of a CDM project equals the cash flows yielded by its underlying asset, CERs. In 
addition, CERs are highly liquid so that they are traded in carbon markets like any other 
commodities. CER units have the same price in carbon markets regardless of where it was 
produced. 
2.4.2 A Clean Development Mechanism Project Case 
N2O Emission Reduction in Brazil 
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 The Project Design approved by the CDM Executive Board gives a brief project 
outline as the following. 
Adipic acid is a white crystalline solid used primarily as the main input of nylon, 
representing about half of the nylon molecule. It is also used in low-temperature synthetic 
lubricants, coatings, plastics, polyurethane resins, as well as for tangy flavor of imitation 
food products. It is manufactured in a two-stage process: first the oxidation of cyclohexane to 
form a cyclohexanone/cyclohexanol mixture and then the oxidization of cyclohexanol or 
cyclohexanone with nitric acid. N2O is generated as a by-product of the second stage and 
vented to the atmosphere as waste gas. 
The host of the project is Rhodia Energy Brazil. Rhodia has a plant at Paulinia in the 
state of Sao Paulo, Brazil, and it manufactures adipic acid with both stages of production. 
The CDM project consists of the installation of a dedicated facility to convert the nitrous 
oxide into nitrogen, using the process of thermal decomposition, and to reduce N2O 
emission. The investors of this project include Rhodia Energy Brazil (Brazil), Rhodia Energy 
SAS (France) and Rhodia Energy GHG SAS (France). The annual emission reductions are 
estimated to be 5,961,165 tones of CO2 equivalent. The yielding started in 2007 and will end 
in 2013.  
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
3.1 Emission Trading 
The idea of tradable permits dates back to Coase in 1960 who showed that allocating 
permits and allowing permit holders to trade can be an efficient method.  Emission trading 
rests on the Coasian solution to the tragedy of the commons—privatize the commons and 
trade the resulting property rights.  With regards to environmental assets, under some 
relatively straightforward conditions, economic theory implies that an emission trading 
framework will deliver emission reductions at the lowest cost to society.   
There is evidence to support this assertion from experience in the 1990 U.S. Sulfur 
dioxide emissions trading program.  Several studies show that the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading 
program was successful in that it achieves the emission target levels at a much lower cost 
than projected (Burtraw et al., 2005; Schmalensee et al., 1998).  
 However, some people view market trading in environmental assets as ethically 
dubious.  Lohmann (2006) is critical of carbon trading in that it reduces the political space 
available for education, movement building and planning around the needed fair transition 
away from fossil fuels. 
 Apart from ethical disagreements, orthodox economists argue that an efficient 
outcome, where it is not able to make someone better off without making someone else 
worse off, may not necessarily be desirable or equitable.  In emission markets, equity 
primarily depends on the initial allocation of the permits. 
Some studies point out that the implementation of the EU-ETS was not fair in that the 
initial allocation of permits were not equitably distributed. Lohmann (2006) argues that the 
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permits were disproportionally acquired by those who have the most power to appropriate 
them and the most financial interests. Pearce (2002) also argues that efficiency does not 
necessarily lead to equitable results.  
The tradable permits mechanism, represented by the EU-ETS, is designed to enable 
emissions abatement to occur in the least costly locations.  By economic theory, with some 
conditions, the EU-ETS will deliver carbon abatement at the lowest cost (textbook).  
Evidence exists to support this claim from the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program. 
3.2 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
While the framework of EU-ETS is to achieve carbon reduction at the least cost 
within the EU region, linked with the Kyoto Protocol scheme later, the Clean Development 
Mechanism started as an equivalent of the EU-ETS in the Kyoto Protocol ratified countries, 
including the EU.  Likewise EU firms which are regulated by the EU-ETS, now need to 
secure permits, which are CERs (Certified Emission Reductions) if they believe it is cheaper 
than purchasing CERs (Brechet and Lussis, 2006).  However, several issues are involved. 
Firstly, as a result of short-term efficient outcome, CDM projects are unevenly 
distributed in a few countries according to a CDM Executive Board statistics; particularly 
China, India, and Brazil.  The reason why the abatement projects are concentrated leads to 
the second issue. 
Since those countries have become power-houses of manufacturing in the past 
decade, a large number of greenhouse gases intensive factories, such as refrigerator plants 
which emit HFC-23, are located at home.  Reducing one ton of HFC-23 emissions has the 
same impact as reducing 11,700 tons of carbon dioxide emissions (Hepburn, 2007).  As such, 
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it is easy to generate large amounts of CERs from HFC-23 capture.  In short, the CDM has 
directed private-sector efforts to the short-term efficient outcome. 
Thirdly, the consequence of capturing economically efficient greenhouse gases 
emissions by firms of industrialized nations is criticized by some people as the ―low-hanging 
fruit‖ problem.  Narain and Veld (2007) argue that if developing countries allow their cheap 
abatement sources to be used now, they may find themselves worse off in future when they 
take on emissions reduction commitments of their own as only costly abatement options will 
remain.   
Fourth, the CDM can be viewed as a subsidy rather than a market-based mechanism 
because the Protocol participating countries transfer funds to less industrialized nations 
(Wara, 2007).  It is pointed out that, although the CDM seeks out the cheapest projects, it is 
not cost-effective because the investors pay a substantially higher price than a marginal 
abatement cost in developing countries. 
The CDM has become evident that its design has several issues in efficiency and 
equity.  A received criticism is high transaction costs due to complicated certification 
processes and lengthy waiting times, which in turn require the project will reduce emissions 
beyond and above the baseline scenario. 
As Hepburn (2007) points out, it does little to prevent the energy sector from locking 
in high-carbon capital assets.  For example, fuel-hungry emerging economies keep adding 
low cost but inefficient coal-fired plants in order to meet energy demands.  Moreover, 
because of the imbalance between the demand and the supply of CDM projects, recipients in 
developed countries have to pay substantially more than marginal abatement costs.  
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Therefore, this mismatch results in the CDM being a subsidy to developing countries rather 
than a market mechanism. 
The tradable permits scheme that requires internal organizational decision making is 
the interest of this paper.  A variety of decision tools are needed for firms to respond to the 
policy instrument.  Simply put, a firm has to decide whether to reduce emissions by itself or 
to purchase permits. 
3.3 Real Options Approach 
According to Laurikka and Koljonen (2006), in a given period, emissions trading 
alters cash flows by four factors: operating cost, value of allocated permits, output price, and 
additional revenue from permits surplus.  Corporate decision-makers have a need for 
selection methodologies that allow them to choose the most profitable scenario.  Some of the 
issues may be well dealt with standard cost/benefit analysis.  However, in the case of coping 
with significantly irreversible investments, the outcomes are highly uncertain.  Therefore real 
options analysis can better serve the purpose with the flexibility to defer the investment. 
One of the earliest applications of monetary valuation theory in environmental 
economics is the work of Brennan and Schwartz (1985).  Self-financing portfolio approach, 
in which a portfolio’s cash flows replicate the value of the asset of interest, is introduced to 
develop a model valuing the cash flows from a natural resource investment.  Thereafter the 
model is applied to a numerical example so as to consider the optimal timing of natural 
resource investment including the possibilities of operating, closing, and reopening a project. 
However, it is Dixit and Pindick (1994) on which the first systematic foundation of 
options theory in resources/environmental economics was built.  An analogy from financial 
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theory is drawn to present real options theory as a powerful tool in dealing with irreversible 
investments, often seen in environmental economics, with uncertainty.   
Indeed, theoretically, the option value that has arisen in environmental economics is 
no different from the option value concept in financial theory.  In the environmental option 
approach, a value of information, whether or not to invest in the second period with no new 
forthcoming information, appears as a separate component.  By contrast, such a value is 
implicitly embedded in the financial option value.  Fisher (1999) sheds a light on this saddle 
difference by theoretically comparing the two concepts. 
In the context of applying real options theory into tradable emissions permit, 
pollutants always have a great interest on the option to build and the options to stop 
construction and/or operations at a series of discrete times, since it is a costly and irreversible 
investment.   
The option value of an abatement investment as well the critical prices of emissions 
allowance have been explored in the literature.   
Insley (2003) uses a numerical finite difference approach to demonstrate a problem of 
sulfur emissions abatement investment under the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act.  In particular, 
regulated polluters have the option either to cut off sulfur dioxide emissions or to install 
scrubbers.  There is no need to purchase permits if the option to install scrubbers is exercised.  
It is clear that the projected benefit of installing scrubbers depends on how the polluter 
expects the permit price to evolve.  Insley studies the impact of uncertainty in the permit 
price on the polluter’s decision to install scrubbers. 
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Firms must consider the monetary value of the installation option and the optimal 
exercise time.  This takes the form of a trigger permit price above which the firm needs to 
install scrubbers immediately.  Otherwise, the firm is better off to wait and hold the option 
until the permit price reaches a trigger level.  The paper further examines whether or not firm 
investment decision under the Clean Air Act has been consistent with optimal decision that is 
predicted, based on the asset valuation model.  This follow-up study reveals both the validity 
and the limitation of options theory in environmental economics. 
Since the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been in practice only since 
2005, few studies of economic evaluation have been done in this emerging area.  It is clear 
from Insley (2003) and others that inducing high permit prices is a necessary condition for a 
cap and trade program to be effective and successful.  This quality is empirically confirmed 
again in the CDM.   
Sarkis and Tamarkin (2005) evaluate the application of options theory for corporate 
abatement investments under the CDM regime with an actual case study.   In particular, they 
consider a project of carbon re-injection.  The abatement project involves re-injection and 
long-term underground storage of carbon dioxide in the reservoir from which natural gas was 
extracted.  Likewise the Insley case, the firm has the option to postpone installation of the re-
injection unit until a future date.  This option to defer comes with a cost: it has to purchase 
permits while it extracts natural gas.  As such, the firm has to decide the optimal time to 
install the re-injection unit. 
They use the internal trading experience of British Petroleum for projected carbon 
price in the future and how the price evolves.  Furthermore, the analysis study concludes that 
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the optimal managerial decision on CO2 emission reduction is purchasing credits rather than 
initiating abatement investments given relative low credit prices in the past. 
  Abadie and Chamorro (2008) consider a power firm located in the EU which operates 
a coal-fired plant.  Electricity Generation on a sustained basis now requires either to install a 
carbon capture and storage or to purchase EU Allowances (EUAs) from the EU-ETS.  If the 
firm initially has EUAs, it makes economic sense to install the carbon capture and storage so 
as to sell EUAs to at a high price.  The power company has to evaluate the EUAs with the 
cost of the carbon capture and storage.  As is the case with Insley and Sarkis & Tamarkin, the 
installation cost, the carbon capture and storage in this case, is well known, however the 
EUA price is uncertain. 
Though, the carbon capture and storage unit also consume the plant’s electricity 
output, which stochastically evolves.  What differs from the previous two papers is that both 
the output, electricity, price and the permit, EUA, price are uncertain.  Therefore, valuation 
of the carbon capture and storage unit must take uncertainty on the revenue side and the cost 
side in to consideration.  The power firm looks ahead while trying to exploit any further 
information about the future EUA prices.  The EU-ETS plays a crucial role in this regard as 
well as electricity markets. 
They employ a two-dimensional binomial lattice to derive the optimal exercise price 
because two stochastic prices are involved.  In particular, they study the trigger EUA prices 
above which the option to install the carbon capture and storage is optimal.  The conclusion 
is that at EUA prices in 2007 immediate installation of the carbon capture and storage cannot 
be justified from a economic point of view.  However, the EU-ETS trend changes 
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dramatically or carbon capture technology undergoes significant improvements this will not 
be the case. 
In order to determine trigger prices for an abatement investment being initiated the 
focus of interest is how the underlying asset price, the credit price for the instance of the 
CDM, evolves over the time.  Two stochastic processes; geometric Brownian motion and 
mean-reverting, are commonly adopted for predicting it.  It is interest to see whether the two 
processes will result in different trigger prices.  Conrad and Kotani (2005) examine both the 
two processes on an irreversible oil drilling problem and ask what the trigger price for crude 
oil is in order to justify the investment and the loss of a wildness amenity dividend.  The 
model is applicable to a wide range of economic valuation of investments with uncertainty. 
Since my research question is to identify trigger emission credit prices for abatement 
investments, I will discuss this model in details and suggest potential improvements. 
Little empirical study on valuation of CDM projects has been done to date.  This paper will 
contribute to the existing literature by enriching empirical studies on the valuation of CDM 
projects based on CERs traded on emerging carbon markets.  It will also certainly benefit 
policy makers in further improving the market mechanisms in practice and CDM project 
owners/investors in making investment decisions and managing price volatility associated 




Chapter 4. Models 
4.1 Model with geometric Brownian motion 
4.1.1 Present Value of CDM Project 
Consider a firm in a developed country which uses a polluting input in its production 
process. To simplify the discussion, we consider a single input-single output framework. The 
firm has to purchase emission allowances (CERs) by the amount of A to produce output Q: 
i.e., Q = f(A). The firm has two options of acquiring emission allowances; either it purchases 
CERs in the emission trading market or it invests in a CDM project in a developing country. 
By investing I in a CDM project, it acquires a credit of A for emission allowance. 
If the firm purchases CERs with a price of P in the emission trading market, its profit 
function becomes 0 = R(A) – PA, where R(A) is the revenue from the sale of output. On the 
other hand, if the firm invests I in a CDM project, its profit (excluding the investment cost) is 
simply 1 = R(A). Thus, the value of the investment for CDM is the difference in profits: 
 ( )v P PA .  
We now assume that the price of CERs follows a geometric Brownian motion: 
 dP Pdt Pdz    
where   is the drift parameter,  > 0 is the variance parameter and dz is the increment of a 
Wiener Process with tdz dt  . The expected price of CERs grows at a constant rate  , 
with variance increasing over time. 
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If the construction period lasts for T years and the project life lasts for additional L 
years, the present discount value of the CDM investment over L years is 
 
 ( )
( ) ( )
1
( ) [ ]
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T L
t T r t T
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where r is the discount rate. For this problem to make sense, we assume that r  .  
4.1.2 Derivation of the trigger CER price 
If we denote the option value of the investment as a function of the CER price F(P), the 
Bellman equation becomes 
 ( ) [ ( )]rF P dt E dF P .  
Over a time interval dt, the total expected return on the investment opportunity, rFdt, should 
equal to its expected rate of capital appreciation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.140). By 
expanding dF(P) using Ito’s Lemma, we get  
 2 2
1
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2
P F P PF P rF P     . (4.1.2) 




. The value function F(P) should satisfy the above 
differential equation and the following three boundary conditions. 
 (0) 0F  . (4.1.3) 
 * *( ) ( )F P V P I  . (4.1.4) 
 * *( ) ( )F P V P  . (4.1.5) 
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Condition (3) implies that the option value of investment is zero when the CER price is zero. 
Condition (4) is the value-matching condition which says that the option value of investment 
equals its net value of investment at the trigger price P
*
. Condition (5) is the smooth-pasting 
condition which says that the change in the option value should equal the change in the 
expected present value of the investment at the trigger price. 
 To satisfy the boundary condition (3), the solution must take the form 
 ( )F P aP  (4.1.6) 
Where a is a constant to be determined and  > 1 is a constant which depends on the 
parameters of the differential equation (2). By substituting equation (6) into equations (4) and 
(5), we get 
  
 ( ) *
*










































      




4.2 Model with Mean-Reverting 
4.2.1 Present Value of CDM Project 
As shown in Figure 5.1.2, the trend of CERs may follow a mean reverting process 
rather than geometric Brownian motion. We now assume that the price of CER follows a 
mean-reverting process, and derive the trigger price. We consider a commonly used mean-
reverting process, called an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.  The CER price evolves according 
to 
( )dP P P dt dz     
where  is the speed of reversion to the long-run equilibrium price P ,  is the variance 
parameter and dz is the increment of a Wiener process. If the price of CERs follows the 
mean-reverting process and the current price is P, the expected price at future date t is 
[ ] ( ) ttE P P P P e
    
 We constructed two value functions for the previous geometric Brownian motion, and 
likewise we do the same for mean-reverting.  The option value to develop a CDM project 
will be denoted by ( )F P , and the present value when the development is initiated, which 
will be denoted by ( )V P .  Recall that there is a construction phase of T  years before the 
project starts yielding CERs and the production is expected to last L  years, with an average 
output of A  CER units per year. 
      The present value of the CDM project when construction is initiated is: 
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(4.2.1) 
4.2.2 Derivation of the CER trigger price 
The option value while waiting to develop the project ( )F P  must satisfy the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation: 
                                
2 2
( ) '( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) ''( )
2
P
rF P F t P P PF P F P

   
                                  
(4.2.2)
 
Since there is no analytic solution for ( )F P , we have to solve it numerically. 
Because there is no analytic solution, the value-matching and smooth-pasting condition 
cannot be applied.   
      Instead, this problem may be formulated as a linear complementarity problem.  Define 
PV  such that: 
2 2
( ) [ '( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) ''( )]
2
P
PV rF P F t P P PF P F P

      
The three boundary conditions for the linear complementarity problem require: 




                                                ( ) { ( ) } 0F P V P I                                                                
(4.2.4) 
                                                [ ( ) { ( ) }] 0PV F P V P I                                                        
(4.2.5) 
where I  is the fixed construction cost. 
      Condition (4.2.3) states that ( )rF P  must be greater than or equal to the expected capital 
gain of the value function while waiting to develop.  Otherwise, it does not make economic 
sense for investors to develop the CDM project.   
      Condition (4.2.4) says that the option value while waiting should be larger than or equal 
to the expected net revenue from exercising the option now.  Again, otherwise, the option to 
develop should be postponed.   
      Condition (4.2.5) implies that either (4.2.3) or (4.2.4) must hold as an equality.  In other 
words, if 0PV  , then ( ) { ( ) } 0F P V P I   , and it is optimal to hold the option.  If 0PV  , 
then ( ) { ( ) } 0F P V P I   , and it is optimal to exercise the option.  
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Chapter 5. Models Implementations and Results 
5.1 European Climate Exchange Market History 
The EU Allowances (EUAs) and the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are 
traded on 
different carbon markets and over-the-counter markets as well.  Because of its volume of 
trade and liquidity, the European Climate Exchange (ECX) is the largest carbon market up to 
date.  EUA and CER prices data from the ECX are used in this paper.  Contract unit is 1000 
ton of carbon dioxide equivalent.  Prices are quoted in euros/tone.  As usual in future markets, 
all open contracts are marked-to-market daily and trading takes place continuously (Abadie 
& Chamorro, 2008). 
December 2009 and December 2012 contracts are drawn on the following figures, 
where the December 2012 has the longest maturity as the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol expires on the end of 2012.  Since daily prices seemed too volatile, I took 
weekly averages of them in order to make price trends clear.  I performed the same for the 
volumes.  As easily expected, for both the CER and the EUA the December 2012 contract is 
always quoted slightly higher that the December 2009 contract because the former has a 
longer maturity. 
 It is not obvious to tell if the EUA price and the volume are significantly correlated.  
While the volume has continued to climbing, the price rises as frequent as it drops.  With 
regard to the CER, as the volume has become steady and abundant after the first four months 
the price took a downturn. 
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 The two prices made a steep decline alike on September 2008 and onward.  It is 
reasonable to conclude that the world financial crisis has caused massive defunds from the 
carbon market.   
 Figure 5.1.3 indicates that the CER price and the EUA price share almost an identical 
trend.  The reason is that they are a physically identical asset, one ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent, and they are often practically swapped on the ECX. 
 

























































































Figure 5.1.3 EUA and CER: price 
5.2 Model Implementation with Geometric Brownian Motion 
5.2.1 Parameters Estimation 
The Matlab code can be found in Appendix A.1. 
In order to estimate drift rate   and the volatility rate   for the geometric Brownian 
motion, I used daily CER prices up to the end of May 2009 publicized from the European 
Climate Exchange.  By Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the Maximum Likelihood Estimates can 
obtain the mean, m , and the standard deviation, s  of the series 1ln( ) ln( )t tP P  .  Then 
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                                                                   s   
The drift rate   turned out to be negative, and I believe this is predominantly due to a 
strong downward trend after the world financial crisis occurred in September 2008.  Thus, I 
decided to use only the daily prices up to September 14, 2008. 
Since the selection of the discount rate depends on an investor’s risk sensitivity, its 
value is crucial in real options valuing, ultimately, making investment decisions.  I varied it 
from 2% to 8%.  The lower limit was set to 2% in reference to 10-year U.S. Treasury Yield 
rates in 2008. 
5.2.2 Model Implementation 
The Matlab code can be found in Appendix A.2. 
 As I discussed in 4.1 Model with geometric Brownian motion, there is an analytical 
expression for the trigger price *P .  I simply implemented the equations on Matlab.  
5.3 Model Implementation with Mean-Reverting 
5.3.1 Parameters Estimation 
The Matlab code can be found in Appendix B.1. 
Same as the geometric Brownian motion model I used daily CER prices up to the end of May 
2009 so as to estimate the mean price P , the reverting speed  , and the volatility rate  .  
By Dixit and Pindyck (1994), I ran the regression  
1t t t tP P a bP       
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   











where   is the standard error of the regression. 
 Again, I varied the discount rate from 2% to 8% for the same reason as the geometric 
Brownian motion model. 
5.3.2 Model Implementation 
The Matlab code can be found in Appendix B.2. 
 I use the finite difference method described in Pelet (2003) to solve (4.2.2) of the 
mean-reverting model. 
                               
2 2
( ) [ '( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) ''( )]
2
P
rF P F t P P PF P F P

   
                     (4.2.2) 
The partial derivatives can be approximated by the differences: 
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The central difference approximation is used for the variable P  and the backward difference 




, 1 1, , 1,i j i j i j i jF p F p F p F
 




1 2 2 2
t i i P i P
p
r t
        









     
2 2 2
1 2 2 2
t i i P i P
p
r t
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     
Then, the boundary conditions (4.2.3) – (4.2.5) can be expressed by: 
0, 0jF 
 





F Ai P I  
 
where  the trigger price is *i P . 
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5.4 Numerical Results for Trigger Prices 
5.4.1 Trigger Prices with respect to the Discount Rate 
The parameters are shown in Table 5.4.1. 
 
 
  P¯  (€) η μ σ r  (%) I  (€) A  (CER unit) L  (year)  
GBM        n.a.        n.a. 0.0029 0.0205 4.68 7800000 41728155 7 
M-R 15.65 0.295       n.a. 0.32 4.68 7800000 41728155 7 
Table 5.4.1  Baseline Prameters 
 
Figure 5.4.1 Trigger prices with respect to the discount rate 
 It is shown in Figure 5.4.1 that under the geometric Brownian motion model the 
discount rate increases the trigger price.  Intuitively speaking, suppose that I have the money 





























to buy the option.  Using the analytical expression for the trigger price (4.1.7), this 
characteristic can be confirmed with some algebraic manipulation.   
Recall that: 












                                                    
(4.1.7) 






















Let r   be x .  Then 0x  , since 0r   . 







                                                           
(5.4.1) 
As 0x  , 1 0xLe  , and thus 1 1 0xLe   . 
Therefore, the discount rate r , or x  increases as the trigger price does.  A change in x  is 
extremely small, in a scale of one hundredths, compared to L .  We can see the denominator
1 xLe  as a part of the constant 'C .  Thus:  
* 'P C x  
The numerical results indeed represents an approximately linear growth. 
 Paddock, Siegel and Smith (1988) present that with a geometric Brownian motion 
model the trigger price for an oil field development option, an analogy to my case, increases 
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the discount rate, where petroleum production is the underlying asset of the development 
option.  A sensitivity analysis done by Conrad and Kotani (2005) also confirms that the 
trigger price for an oil development project and the discount rate are positively correlated. 
 As it is seen from Figure 5.4.1, the discount rate decreases the trigger price under the 
mean-reverting model.  Since there is no analytical expression for the trigger price in the 
mean-reverting process, I argue the reasoning with parameters analysis. 
 A convenience yield which exists in the geometric Brownian motion model is not a 
input parameter for the mean-reverting model.  However, it is well known that a convenience 
yield equivalent   can be expressed by: 
( )r P P     
Regardless of the price level, an increase in the discount rate r  leads to a larger convenience 
yield.  A convenience yield can be seen as the flow of benefits associated with the underlying 
asset.  As Dixit and Pindyck (1994) point out, the higher the convenience yield, the lower the 
option value while waiting, and thus so is the trigger price. 
 Pelet (2003) and Fackler (2007) support that the discount rate reduces the trigger 
price for an oil field development option under the mean-reverting model. 
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5.4.2 Trigger Prices with respect to the Investment Cost 
 
Figure 5.4.2 Trigger prices with respect to investment cost 
 It is shown in Figure 5.4.2 that the trigger price under the geometric Brownian motion 
increases as the investment cost grows.  Intuitively, a higher investment cost requires a larger 
present value of the project to pay off, and in turn leads to a higher trigger price.  The 
analytical expression for the trigger price is consistent with this tendency. 
 Again recall that: 












                                                    
(4.1.7) 
We can think of all variables but I as one constant term C .  Then: 
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Figure 5.4.2 presents that the trigger price is a linear function of the investment cost. 
 A sensitivity analysis of Conrad and Kotani (2005) shows that the trigger price under 
the geometric Brownian motion has a positive correlation with the investment cost. 
 The investment cost increases the trigger price under the mean-reverting model in 
Figure 5.4.2.  Since there is no analytical expression for the mean-reverting, I can use only a 
general expression for the reasoning.  At the trigger price it can be seen at large: 
*( )V P AP I   
Then,                                                         *





We know ( )V P  from (4.2.1): 
( )(1 ) (1 )( )
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(5.4.2) 
Therefore it has been shown that the trigger price grows as the investment cost increases. 
 A sensitivity analysis performed by Conrad and Kotani (2005) also confirms that the 




5.4.3 Trigger Prices with respect to Project Period 
 
Figure 5.4.3 Trigger prices with respect to project period 
 It is seen from Figure 5.4.3 that the project period reduces the trigger price under the 
geometric Brownian motion model.  Intuition tells us that a longer project period has more 
time for recovering the investment cost, and thus it allows lower trigger prices.  Using a more 



















0x   
As 0x  , 1 0xLe  , and thus 1 1 0xLe   . 
Therefore, the trigger price drops as the project period L  increases.  The trigger price 



































 Pelet (2003) supports that a project period reduces the trigger price for an oil 
development option under the geometric Brownian motion process. 
 The trigger price under the mean-reverting process in Figure 5.4.3 indicates a growth 
as the project period increases.  I explain this relation in a general term because there is no 
analytical expression for the trigger price in the case of the mean-reverting.  From (5.4.2) we 
know in general at the trigger price: 
(
*
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As L  grows the terms 1 rLe  and ( )1 r Le    increase, and in turn so does the trigger price.  
The trigger price approaches an upper bound 1 2 3C C C   as the project period L  goes to an 
infinitely large number. 
 Pelet (2003) shows that the trigger price for an oil development option under the 





Chapter 6. Conclusion 
The benefit of the mean-reverting model lies in describing a stochastic variable which 
reverts to a mean in the long run.  Many commodities such as crude oil are regarded to 
follow the mean-reverting process.  However, it comes at a cost in real options theory.  The 
fact that it has no analytical solution makes the calculation complicated, and thus it is less 
pursued by the researcher and the practitioner alike.      
With no doubt the market history fits the mean-reverting model better than the 
geometric Brownian motion model.  The reason is two-folded.  First, the geometric Brownian 
motion does not seem to be a valid assumption for the historical data.  The data does not have 
an upward drift.  Second, the trigger prices for the geometric Brownian motion turn out to be 
extremely off of historical CER prices, while those for the mean-reverting are in a reasonable 
range. 
One can observe large differences between the trigger prices yielded by the geometric 
Brownian motion model and the mean-reverting model.  The trigger prices under the 
geometric Brownian motion process are far below the mean-reverting level because the 
market history lacks an upward drift, while the geometric Brownian motion assumes it as a 
fundamental condition.  Therefore, the calculation ends up underestimating the present value 
of the CDM project, yielding unjustifiable low trigger prices.   
Finally, comparisons with analytical analysis are consistent with the empirical results 
and thus confirming the validity of both the models.  It is interesting to notice that the 
discount rate increases trigger prices with the geometric Brownian motion process, as 
intuitionally expected, but reduce those with the mean-reverting model.  Unlike the 
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geometric Brownian motion process the inexplicit convenience yield of the mean-reverting 
grows as the discount rate increases. 
I would like to mention a few potential extensions to this paper.  First, the mean-
reverting process with jumps may better serve the cases where abnormal price shocks are 
frequently observed.  This approach takes the possible arrival of abnormal information into 
consideration by adding a binomial variable following a probability density function, which 
is either zero or a jump size. 
Second, as an alternate to the CER price one can use the EUA price in order to 
calculate parameters.  The EUA price has more than four years of market history and thus is 
likely to yield more realistic parameters compared to the CER price.  Indeed, the CER and 
the EUA are virtually pegged on the European Climate Exchange in a way that they are inter-
exchangeable.  However, it involves an issue of choosing a fixed change rate between the 
two stochastically evolving variables. 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that none of the two models is a valid framework for CER 
prices.  As Fackler (2007) points out, it one factor is often the time inadequate in modeling 
the dynamic behavior of stochastic prices and that at least two or three factor models are 
needed to capture the term structure implied by those prices.  Meanwhile, I believe that real 
options theory will have a variety of applications in the evaluation of emerging irreversible 






Appendix  MATLAB Code 




    delta_x(i)=x(i+1)-x(i); 
end 
m = mean(delta_x); 
s = std(delta_x); 
  
mu = m+(s^2/2) 
sigma = s 
 
A.2  Geometric Brownian Motion 
 




L = 7; 




c = 1-exp(-(r-mu)*L); 
  
P_star=(beta/(beta-1))*((r-mu)*I/(c*A)) 











B.1  Mean-Reverting Parameters 
 
price; % price history  
x=log(price); 
for i=1:length(price)-1 
    delta_x(i)=x(i+1)-x(i); 
    x_short(i)=x(i); 
end 
 
p = polyfit(x_short, delta_x, 1);% 
pop = polyval(p, x_short);% 
res = delta_x - pop;% 
a = p(2);  
b = p(1); 
disp('mean of residual, should be zero =');% 
disp(mean(res)); 
sigma_eps = var(res);% 
eta_star = -log(1+b);% 
x_bar = -a/b;% 
sigma_star = sigma_eps*sqrt(2*log(1+b)/((1+b)^2-1)); 
%%%%%%% 
eta = 365*eta_star * log(mean(price))/mean(price)% 
sigma = 365*sigma_star% 
P_bar = mean(price)*x_bar/log(mean(price)) + sigma^2/(2*eta) 
 
B.2  Mean-Reverting 
 
function out=MR(rho,D,T) 
% Real Options, Mean-Reversion 
% Solution of the Finite Difference Problem 
format compact 
filename = input('Enter test number: ', 's'); 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Real Option Parameters : 
%rho=0.0468; % Exogeneous discount rate 
sigma = 0.32; % Volatility 
eta = 0.295; % Reversion speed 
Pbar = 15.65; % Average CER price (euro) 
  
%D = 0.187; % Investment cost (CER/euro) 
%T = 7; % production period (Expiry) (in years) 




% Finite Difference Grid : 
Pm = 45; % Truncation of the space grid 
dP = 0.1; % Space Grid interval 
dt = 1e-4; % Time Grid interval 
  
% Jump characteristics 
% Reference to function pdf_phi 
  
% Grid Parameters : 
m = Pm/dP; % Number of space steps, better be an integer 





A = dt/(rho*dt+1); 
  
for i = 0:m 
    P(i+1) = dP*i; % Prices scale 
    payoff(i+1)= max(q*P(i+1) - D , 0); % Payoff boundry condition 
    pplus(i+1) = A*1/2*(sigma^2*i^2+i*eta*Pbar-i^2*eta*dP); 
    pzero(i+1) = A*(1/dt-sigma^2*i^2); 
    pminus(i+1)= A*1/2*(sigma^2*i^2-i*eta*Pbar+i^2*eta*dP); 
 if pplus(i+1)<0 
    disp('pplus is negative at i=') 
    disp(i) 
 end 
 if pzero(i+1)<0 
    disp('pzero is negative at i=') 
    disp(i) 
 end 
 if pminus(i+1)<0 
    disp('pminus is negative at i=') 




vold = payoff; 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Time loop 
h = waitbar(0,'Please wait...'); 
time(n+1)=n*dt; 
Stor(n/t_stor+1,:) = vold; 
thres(n+1)=D/q; 
  
for t = n-1:-1:0 
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    time(t+1)=t*dt; 
    F(1)=0; 
     
 % Space loop 
 for i = 1:m 
      
  % Expectation term 
  
  % Calculation of the Option value at time t 
  vold(m+2)=max(q*(m+1)*dP - D, 0); 
  F(i+1) = pplus(i+1)*vold(i+2) + pzero(i+1)*vold(i+1) + 
pminus(i+1)*vold(i); 
  if F(i+1)<payoff(i+1) 
     F(i+1)=payoff(i+1); % Boundary condition 
  end 
  
%%%%%%%%%% 
  % Threshold 
  if (F(i+1)==payoff(i+1)) && (F(i)~=payoff(i)) 
      thres(t+1)=i*dP; 
  end 
 end 
  
 vold = F; % New initial guess 
 % Reduction of vectors sizes 
 if t/t_stor==floor(t/t_stor) 
 tt=t/t_stor; 
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